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PARTNERSHIP FORMATION BASED ON MULTIPLE TRAITS
DAVID M. RAMSEY
Abstract. A model of partnership formation based on two traits, called beauty and character,
is presented. There are two classes of individual and partners must be of different classes.
Individuals prefer prospective partners with a high beauty measure and of a similar character.
This problem may be interpreted as e.g. a job search problem in which the classes are employer
and employee, or a mate choice problem in which the classes are male and female. Beauty can be
observed instantly. However, a costly date (or interview) is required to observe the character of
a prospective partner. On observing the beauty of a prospective partner, an individual decides
whether he/she wishes to date. During a date, the participants observe each other’s character
and then decide whether to form a pair. Mutual acceptance is required both for a date to
occur and pair formation. On finding a partner, an individual stops searching. Beauty has a
continuous distribution on a finite interval, while character ’forms a circle’ and has a uniform
distribution. Criteria based on the concept of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are used to
define a symmetric equilibrium of this game. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique. When
dating costs are high, this equilibrium is a block separating equilibrium as in more classical
formulations of two-sided job search problems. However, for sufficiently small dating costs the
form of this equilibrium is essentially different.
Keywords: game theory, partnership formation, multiple traits, subgame perfect equilib-
rium.
1. Introduction
This paper presents a model of pair formation based on two traits, called beauty and character.
There are two classes of individual, and each individual wishes to form a partnership with
someone from the other class. Individuals observe a sequence of potential partners. Mutual
acceptance is required for a partnership to form. On finding a partner, an individual ceases
searching. One measure describes ’beauty’. Preferences are common according to this measure,
i.e. individuals prefer beautiful partners and all individuals of one class agree on how beautiful
a member of the other class is. Preferences are homotypic with respect to the second trait,
referred to as ’character’, i.e. individuals prefer partners of a similar character.
It is assumed that individuals know their own beauty and character. Together the beauty,
character and class of an individual define his/her type. The distributions of these traits are
continuous on a finite interval. It should be noted that individuals’ types are fixed, i.e. they do
not age (for a model of mate choice based on age preferences see Alpern et al. [2010]). Individuals
observe the beauty and character of prospective partners perfectly. However, in order to observe
character, a costly ’date’ is required. In addition, individuals incur search costs.
At each stage of the search process an individual meets a prospective partner. First, both
decide whether they wish to date based on the beauty of the prospective partner. After a
date, both decide whether to form a pair or not. This decision is based on both traits of the
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prospective partner. At equilibrium each individual uses a strategy appropriate to their type.
The set of strategies corresponding to an equilibrium is called an equilibrium strategy profile.
Such a problem may be interpreted, e.g. as a mate choice problem where the classes are
male and female, or as a job search problem with employers and employees. In terms of a job
search problem, the search costs of the employers may involve advertising a position, the search
costs of an employee may involve looking for an appropriate position and preparing a suitable
CV. The dating costs of an employer may involve the costs of setting up an interview and/or
accepting an employee on probation. The assumption that beauty can be observed very quickly,
but dating is required to observe someone’s character, is a simplification. However, in the case
of human mate choice many traits that can be thought of as defining beauty (physical beauty,
economic status) are usually measured quickly, whilst traits defining character (political and
religious views, tastes and emotions) are generally more difficult to measure.
Parker (1983) was the first to present a model of two-sided choice in which both sexes prefer
mates of high value. At equilibrium, class i males are paired with class i females and there may
be one class of either sex who do not mate. McNamara and Collins (1990) consider a similar job
search game. Unlike Parker, they explicitly assume that each individual observes a sequence of
prospective partners. However, their conclusions are similar.
Further work in the economics literature has developed a ’steady state’ approach to such
games. Under such models, individuals leave the pool of searchers on finding a partner and
are replaced by others, see e.g. Burdett and Coles (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith
(2006). The steady state distributions of the values of both classes of searcher depend on
the strategies used within the population. From the viewpoint of these papers, the model of
McNamara and Collins (1990) assumes that on leaving the pool of searchers a pair of individuals
are replaced by clones, i.e. the distributions of the values of both types of searcher are fixed.
On the other hand, there may be a mating (or work) season and as it progresses the distribu-
tion of the value of available partners changes. Collins and McNamara (1993) first formulated
such a model as a one-sided job search problem with continuous time. Ramsey (2008) considers
a similar problem with discrete time. Johnstone (1997) presents numerical results for a discrete
time, two-sided mate choice problem. Alpern and Reyniers (2005) and Alpern and Katrantzi
(2008) use a more analytic approach and Mazalov and Falko (2008) extend these results.
Alpern and Reyniers (1999) consider a two-sided model in which individuals have homotypic
preferences. Mate choice is based on a numeric trait x with the same distribution in both sexes.
The cost of mating is the absolute difference between the traits of the partners. The number of
prospective mates is finite and the cost of not mating is sufficiently large to ensure that in the
last search period an individual prefers mating with the most dissimilar partner to not mating.
Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1994) model the evolution of female preferences for multiple sexual
ornaments. It is argued that traits can be combined to define a one-dimensional measure of
beauty. However, it may be easier to observe some traits than others. Fawcett and Johnstone
(2003) consider a model where only females are choosy and can use two signals of male quality. If
signals are not very reliable (but not very unreliable), a female should first observe the cheapest
signal to evaluate. If it indicates that a male is of high quality, then she should observe the
second signal. Sozou (2005) and Seymour and Sozou (2009) consider models of costly dating.
Kinsella and Ramsey (2010) present a model of a similar game to the one presented here, in which
the distributions of the traits are discrete. They describe the form of a symmetric equilibrium
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and propose an exhaustive search algorithm, which uses the form of the equilibrium to ensure
efficient search. When the distribution of traits is continuous, such an approach is not possible.
In the model presented here, the following assumptions are made:
A: We consider the formation of long term relationships between two classes of player.
When an individual finds a partner, he/she leaves the population of searchers. Hence-
forth, we refer to the classes as males and females and use the language of mate choice.
B: Interactions occur between a male and a female. The length of an interaction is assumed
to be small compared to the time between interactions. A pair must decide whether to
form a partnership or continue searching. Mutual acceptance is required for partnership
formation. Individuals cannot return to a previous prospective partner.
C: When an individual leaves the population, he/she is replaced by a clone. Hence, the
joint distribution of beauty and character is fixed. It might be more realistic to consider
a steady-state approach. However, due to the issues involved in deriving equilibria, for
the present the simpler clone replacement approach is adopted. It is intended that the
steady state approach will be adopted in future work.
D: Time is assumed to be discrete. The search costs per unit time are c1, independently
of sex. At each moment a player encounters a prospective partner. We assume random
matching, i.e. the beauty and character of the female encountered by a male is chosen
at random from the joint distribution of these traits among females. One can adapt the
model to assume that encounters occur as a Poisson process by assuming that individuals
find prospective partners at rate 1 and pay search costs of c1 per unit time.
E: Encounters have two stages. In the first stage, both individuals decide whether they
wish to offer a date based on the beauty of the prospective partner. For convenience,
it is assumed that these decisions are made simultaneously. Hence, neither individual
has any information regarding the character of the other. Dating only occurs by mutual
consent and costs c2. During a date, each observes the character of the other and then
decides whether to accept the other as a partner. Again, it is assumed that these choices
are simultaneous. A partnership is formed only by mutual consent. The reward an
individual obtains from partnership formation is increasing in the beauty of the partner
and decreasing in the difference between characters. The total reward of an individual
is the reward gained from the partnership minus the costs of searching and dating.
This approach implicitly assumes that the number of males equals the number of females.
However, the model can be adapted to allow the number of males and females to differ. Suppose
there are R times as many males as females. In this case, we may assume that at each stage
a proportion (R − 1)/R of males meet a prospective partner who would give them a reward of
−∞. In reality, such males do not meet a prospective partner at that moment.
Section 2 compares this approach with classical models. This section aims to give an intuitive
feel for the approach to solving such problems and the added complexity involved when prefer-
ences are mixed. Section 3 describes a model of partnership formation in which character forms
a circle. Section 4 gives the set of criteria that we wish an equilibrium to satisfy. These condi-
tions are based on the concept of a subgame perfect equilibrium (a refinement of the concept of
Nash equilibrium). Section 5 describes the calculation of the expected rewards of each individual
under a given strategy profile. Section 6 considers the dating subgame (when individuals decide
whether to form a partnership) and the offer subgame (when individuals decide whether to offer
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a date). Section 7 presents some results on the form of an equilibrium in the game considered. It
is shown that assortative mating occurs with each individual forming a partnership with another
of similar beauty and character. Some examples are considered in Section 8. This illustrates the
relationship between search and dating costs and the degree of association of the traits. Section
9 outlines some problems associated with generalising the model considered here. Section 10
gives a brief conclusion and suggests directions for further research.
2. Comparison with the Classical Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem
In classical one-sided mate choice problems, the optimal strategy is a threshold strategy where
a female accepts a male if his beauty is at least as great as her expected reward from future
search (ignoring previous costs). Two-sided problems are game-theoretic and so we look for a
Nash equilibrium solution at which no individual can improve their expected reward by changing
strategy. There may be multiple Nash equilibria. For example, suppose that there are two levels
of beauty: high and low. Assume individuals only accept those of the other level of beauty.
This is a Nash equilibrium, since e.g. a male of high beauty cannot gain by accepting a female
of high beauty, as she would not accept him. Also, he could not gain by rejecting a female of
low beauty, since he would not find a partner. However, one expects that if a male accepts a
female of beauty x, then he accepts any female of beauty > x. McNamara and Collins (1990)
derive an equilibrium which satisfies the following condition, referred to as the optimality
criterion: any individual accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward gained from
such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward of the individual from future
search. Such an equilibrium is derived inductively by defining classes of male and females of
successively decreasing attractiveness. A female of maximum beauty will be acceptable to any
male. Hence, such females face a one-sided problem and their equilibrium strategy is of the
form: accept the first male of beauty ≥ x1. Call such males first class. It follows that first class
males are acceptable to any female and their equilibrium strategy is of the form: accept the first
female of beauty ≥ y1. Call such females first class. It follows that first class males will only pair
with first class females. The problem faced by the rest of the population reduces to a problem in
which first class individuals are not present. Define x0 = y0 =∞. Arguing iteratively, k classes
of males and females can be defined, such that a male of beauty x is of class i if xi ≤ x < xi−1
and a female of beauty y is of class j if yj ≤ y < yj−1. Males of class i pair with females of class
i. There may be a class of males or females who do not form partnerships.
In the problem considered here, females do not agree on the desirability of a male. It would
be natural to try and reduce this game to a sequence of one-sided choice problems. However,
there are some technical problems associated with such an approach to games within the general
framework presented above. For example, suppose beauty and character are independent and
both have a uniform distribution on [0, 1] for both sexes. Individuals of beauty 1 and character
0.5 will have a higher expected reward (i.e. be choosier) than individuals of beauty 1 and extreme
character, close to 0 or 1 (see Alpern and Reyniers [1999]). However, an individual of beauty 0.8
and character 0.5 may be less choosy than an individual of beauty 0.8 and extreme character,
since the first may not be acceptable to highly attractive individuals of a similar character, while
the second may be. Hence, a similar approach to that adopted by Collins and McNamara will
not be appropriate. Ramsey (2010) shows that multiple equilibria satisfying an appropriately
generalised optimality condition may exist in a similar problem to the one considered here.
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Due to this, we will consider a particular formulation such that there is a unique equilibrium
satisfying the appropriately generalised optimality criterion (given later). It is assumed that
a: beauty and character are independent and their distributions are independent of sex.
The distribution of character in both sexes is uniform between −y1 and y1. The density
function of beauty is positive only for values between x0 and x1.
b: The difference between characters y2 and y3 is calculated mod(2y1), i.e. character can
be thought of as a circle with characters of absolute value close to y1 being assumed to be
similar. Thus, when y3 > y2, d(y2, y3) is calculated according to d(y2, y3) = d(y3, y2) =
min{y3 − y2, 2y1 + y2 − y3}.
These assumptions suggest that the mating prospects of an individual should not depend on
his/her character and (in this sense) all character levels can be treated as equivalent. Intuitively,
an individual’s expected reward from search is non-decreasing in their beauty. Hence, if an
individual of beauty x wishes to mate with an individual of beauty ≤ x, then acceptance should
be mutual. Thus individuals of maximum beauty face a one-sided search problem. Furthermore,
if an individual of beauty x and character y should offer a date to a prospective partner of beauty
z, then any individual of beauty x should offer such a prospective partner a date.
In real job search games, the employee first observes the ’beauty’ of a job and then may apply
for it. This application may be understood as an ’offer of a date’. This offer will involve some
cost (preparing an appropriate CV/application form). The employer then decides whether to
invite the applicant for interview or not. Hence, such a game is asymmetric and the offer of
a date may well be costly (and possibly give information regarding character). Also, in the
model presented here, costs are incurred during a date, but not when offering a date. This has
implications regarding the form of an equilibrium, since an individual will be indifferent between
offering and not offering a date to a prospective partner who does not want such a date. These
factors will be considered later. The following section gives a formal description of this model.
3. Model of a Symmetric Game with Character Forming a Circle
The population is assumed to be large. Beauty and character are denoted by X and Y ,
respectively. The distribution of these traits is independent of sex. Let X have a continuous
distribution with positive density on the interval between x0 and x1. Character has a uniform
distribution on the interval between −y1 and y1. The type of an individual is defined by their
sex together with a vector (x, y) whose components are beauty and character, respectively.
Individuals prefer partners of high beauty, who have a similar character. To be more precise,
denote the reward obtained by a type (xm, ym) male from pairing with a type (xf , yf ) female
by u(xf , d), where d = d(ym, yf ) is the difference between the two individuals’ characters. It is
assumed that u is bounded, strictly increasing with respect to xf and strictly decreasing with
respect to d. The reward obtained by the female from such a pairing is u(xm, d).
At each moment n (n = 1, 2, . . .), each unpaired male is presented with a female picked
at random. Hence, individuals can observe as many prospective partners as they wish. No
individual can return to a previous prospective partner. The search costs incurred at each stage
by individuals are c1. The costs of dating are c2. Thus it is assumed that search costs are
independent of sex. A glossary of the notation used in this article is given in Table 1.
Individuals observe the type of a prospective partner perfectly. Beauty can be observed
without cost (i.e. in an instant), while dating is required to observe character. Encounters
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Table 1. Glossary of the main notation used
Notation Description
xm and xf Beauty of male and female, respectively
ym and yf Character of male and female, respectively
(xm, ym) and (xf , yf ) Type of male and female, respectively
x0 and x1 Minimum and maximum beauty, respectively
y1 Maximum absolute value of character
d(ym, yf ) distance between characters ym and yf
u(x, d) utility from partner of beauty x with distance between characters d
n and n1 number of prospective partners seen and dated, respectively
c1 and c2 search costs and dating costs, respectively
Γ ’supergame’ played by the whole population
pi strategy profile played by the population in Γ
G(xm, ym, xf , yf ;pi) game played when male of type (xm, ym) meets female
of type (xf , yf ) and the population follow pi
f1 and f2 density function of beauty and absolute character, respectively
f joint density function of beauty and absolute character
A1(xm;pi) or A1(xm) set of female types that date males of beauty xm
A2(xm;pi) or A2(xm) set of female types that pair with a male of type (xm, 0) after a date
A(xm;pi) or A(xm) set of female types that eventually pair with a male of type (xm, 0)
r(x;pi) or r(x) expected net reward from search of individual of type (x, 0) under pi
vm(xm, xf , yf ) value to male of dating subgame played when male of type (xm, 0)
dates female of type (xf , yf ) and the population follow pi
vf (xm, xf , yf ) value to female of the same dating subgame
vm(xm, xf ) expected value to male of the dating subgame when male is
of beauty xm, female is of beauty xf and the population follow pi
vf (xm, xf ) expected value to female of the same dating subgame
a(x) minimum acceptable beauty to an individual of beauty x
b(x) maximum acceptable difference in character to an individual of beauty x
when prospective partner is of beauty a(x)
between a male and female can be thought of as a two-player game which comprises up to
two stages (subgames). In the first, the offer subgame, both decide whether they want to date
based on the beauty of the other. When both wish to date, the pair enter the second stage, the
dating subgame. Here, each observes the character of the other and then simultaneously decides
whether or not to form a partnership. Mutual acceptance is required for a pair to form.
In some scenarios, for example when character is not important, it might pay a pair to mate
immediate without dating. However, to keep the strategy space as simple as possible, it is
assumed that individuals must always date before forming a pair.
An individual’s total reward is the reward gained from pair formation minus the total search
costs. Hence, the total reward of a type (xm, ym) male from pairing with a type (xf , yf ) female
after searching for n moments and dating n1 times is u(xf , d)−nc1−n1c2, where d = d(ym, yf ).
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Let pi be the strategy profile used in the mate search game, referred to as the supergame
Γ. Hence, pi describes the strategy used by each member of the population according to their
type (assumed to be a pure strategy). In Γ each individual observes a sequence of prospective
partners (plays a sequence of two-player games as described above) until a partner is found. The
supergame depends on the distributions of beauty and character, the function u and the search
and dating costs. As described above, an encounter between a male and female is split into the
offer subgame and the dating subgame. These subgames will be considered in Section 6. These
two subgames together define the game played when a male of type (xm, ym) meets a female of
type (xf , yf ) and the strategy profile is pi. This game is denoted by G(xm, ym, xf , yf ;pi).
4. Equilibrium Conditions
We look for a Nash equilibrium profile pi∗ of Γ which is symmetric with respect to sex and
character as follows:
1: If a male of beauty x2 is willing to date a female of beauty x3, then a female of beauty
x2 is willing to date a male of beauty x3.
2: If a male of type (x2, y2) is willing to pair with a female of type (x3, y3) in the dating
subgame, then a female of type (x2, y2) is willing to pair with a male of type (x3, y3).
3: If a male of type (x2, y2) is willing to pair with a female of type (x3, y3) in the dating
subgame, then a male of type (x2, y2+k) is willing to pair with a female of type (x3, y3+k)
[here addition is mod(2y1)].
This Nash equilibrium profile is assumed to satisfy a generalisation of the optimality criterion
for the classical two-sided problem. Namely:
Condition 1: In the dating subgame, an individual accepts a prospective partner if and
only if the reward from such a pairing is at least as great as the individual’s expected
reward from future search (ignoring previous costs).
Condition 2: An individual only offers a date if his/her expected reward from the resulting
dating subgame minus the costs of dating is as least as great as his/her expected reward
from future search.
Condition 3: The decisions made by an individual do not depend on the moment at which
the decision is made.
These conditions are made more precise in Sections 5 and 6. The most preferred partner
of a type (x, y) individual is of type (x1, y), i.e. of maximum beauty and the same character.
Condition 1 states that in the dating subgame an individual will accept his/her most preferred
partner. Moreover, if in the dating subgame a female accepts a male who gives her a reward of
k, then she must accept any male who gives her a reward of ≥ k. Condition 3 requires the Nash
equilibrium profile to be stationary. This reflects the following:
a: An individual starting to search at moment i faces the same problem as one starting at
moment 1.
b: Since the search costs are linear, after searching for i moments and not finding a partner,
an individual maximises his/her expected reward from search simply by maximising the
expected reward from future search (i.e. by ignoring previously incurred costs).
Note that, as in the classical two-sided job search problem of McNamara and Collins (1990),
these conditions rule out non-intuitive Nash equilibria. For example, suppose that both beauty
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and character are discrete and take one of two possible levels. Beauty can be high or low and
character can be left or right. Suppose individuals are only prepared to date those of a different
level of beauty and only mate with those of a different character. No individual can do better
by accepting any other types of date or prospective partner, thus such a strategy profile defines
a Nash equilibrium. However, such a profile would not evolve by natural selection.
5. Deriving the Expected Payoffs Under a Symmetric Strategy Profile
Given a strategy profile, we can define which pairs of types date and which mate. Assume that
the strategy profile used is symmetric with respect to sex and character in the sense described in
Section 4. The expected reward of an individual is independent of sex and character. It suffices
to define the strategies used by males of character 0. Suppose a male of type (z, 0) meets a
female of type (x, y). The difference between characters has a uniform distribution on (0, y1).
Let f1 and f2 denote the density functions of beauty and absolute character, respectively.
Denote the joint density of these traits by f . By assumption, f(x, y) = f1(x)f2(y)
Let A1(z;pi) be the set of types (given by beauty and absolute character) of females that
a male of type (z, 0) will date (under the assumption of mutual acceptance) given the strategy
profile pi. Let A2(z;pi) be the set of types of females that a male of type (z, 0) would pair with in
the dating game (assuming mutual acceptance). Define A(z;pi) to be the set of types of females
that eventually pair with a male of type (z, 0). By definition A(z;pi) = A1(z;pi) ∩A2(z;pi).
The probability of a male of type (z, 0) finding a partner at any given moment is the integral
of the joint density function of the pair of traits over A(z;pi), i.e. the set of females who are
mutually acceptable to the male. His expected length of search is the reciprocal of this integral.
Similarly, the probability that a male of type (z, 0) dates at any given moment is given by the
integral of the joint density function of the pair of traits over A1(z;pi). Considering the costs of
searching and dating, the expected value of the total search costs of such a male is given by
c1 + c2
∫ ∫
A1(z;pi)
f(x, y)dxdy∫ ∫
A(z;pi) f(x, y)dxdy
.
The expected reward of a male of type (z, 0) obtained from pairing (conditioned on mutual
acceptance) is given by ∫ ∫
A(z;pi) u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy∫ ∫
A(z;pi) f(x, y)dxdy
.
Hence, the male’s expected total reward from search, r(z;pi), is given by
(1) r(z;pi) =
∫ ∫
A(z;pi) u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy − c1 − c2
∫ ∫
A1(z;pi)
f(x, y)dxdy∫ ∫
A(z;pi) f(x, y)dxdy
.
When there is no danger of ambiguity, pi will be omitted from the notation used above.
6. The Dating and the Offer Subgames
Note that when the number of possible prospective partners is limited to N , then the equi-
librium strategy profile can be determined by recursion. Firstly, if an individual has not mated
with any of the first N − 1 prospective partners, then he/she must date and then mate with
the final one. Hence, we can determine the expected reward of each individual when only one
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prospective partner remains (equal for all individuals). Based on this, we can determine the
set of prospective partners that each individual should accept in a dating subgame when only
one more prospective mate can be seen afterwards. In turn, we can then determine the set
of prospective partners that each individual should date in the penultimate offer subgame and
so on. Thus there is a unique equilibrium strategy profile satisfying the optimality conditions.
Also, it can be shown that if the equilibrium strategy profile used in the N -horizon problem is
symmetric according to sex and character, then the equilibrium strategy profile in the (N + 1)-
horizon problem is also symmetric (proof omitted). Since the equilibrium strategy when N = 1
is symmetric, it follows by induction that the unique equilibrium is symmetric. However, the
description of the strategy profile for a finite horizon problem is complex, since an individual’s
actions depend not only on his/her type, but also on the number of prospective partners yet
to be seen. On the other hand, in the infinite horizon problem, at equilibrium an individual’s
actions depend only on his/her type. It seems reasonable to assume that there will be a unique
equilibrium strategy profile in the infinite horizon problem, given by the limit of the equilibrium
strategy profile when the number of remaining prospective partners tends to infinity. Estimating
the equilibrium strategy profile in this way would seem to be highly impractical. Hence, we de-
termine the equilibrium strategy profile by considering what conditions must be satisfied in the
dating and offer subgames under an equilibrium strategy profile. Using a recursive approach, it
is natural to consider the dating subgame before considering the offer subgame.
6.1. The Dating Subgame. Assume that the population follow a symmetric strategy profile
pi. The male and female both have two possible actions: accept the prospective partner, denoted
acc, or reject, denoted rej. We assume that these decisions are simultaneous. Also, we ignore
the costs already incurred by both individuals, including the costs of the present date, as they
are subtracted from all the payoffs in the matrix, and do not affect the equilibria in this subgame.
Without loss of generality, suppose the male is of type (z, 0) and the female is of type (x, y).
The payoff matrix is given by
Female: acc Female: rej
Male: acc
Male: rej
(
[u(x, y), u(z, y)] [r(z), r(x)]
[r(z), r(x)] [r(z), r(x)]
)
.
Assume that if an individual is indifferent between pairing and not pairing, then he/she accepts
a prospective partner. From the form of the function u and the distribution of beauty and
character this occurs with probability 0. Otherwise, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game is for the female to accept if and only if u(z, y) > r(x) and for the male to accept if
and only if u(x, y) > r(z). In intuitive terms, an individual accepts a prospective partner if the
difference between their characters does not exceed a threshold which depends on (is increasing
in) the beauty of the prospective partner. Note that this equilibrium satisfies Condition 1.
If a female rejects a male, then the male is indifferent between accepting or rejecting her.
Using the above rule, a male will respond optimally whatever the female does. Let v(z, x, y) =
[vm(z, x, y), vf (z, x, y)] denote the value of this game, where vm and vf are the values to the
male and female, respectively. We now consider the offer game.
6.2. The Offer Subgame. We now solve the offer subgame and hence the game played when
a male of type (z, 0) meets a female of type (x, y), G(z, 0, x, y;pi). Assume that the population
follows a symmetric strategy profile pi. Both individuals decide whether they wish to offer a date
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(denoted off) or continue searching (denoted con). These decisions are made simultaneously
based on the beauty of the prospective partner. As before, we may ignore the costs that have
been previously incurred. The matrix form of this game is given by
(2)
Female: off Female: con
Male: off
Male: con
(
[vm(z, x)− c2, vf (z, x)− c2] [r(z), r(x)]
[r(z), r(x)] [r(z), r(x)]
)
.
Here, v(z, x) = [vm(z, x), vf (z, x)] is the expected value of the dating subgame given that the
male and female are of beauty z and x, respectively. In defining this value, it is assumed that
the players are following the appropriate strategy from the strategy profile pi.
Assume that when an individual is indifferent between dating and not dating, then he/she
offers a date. The appropriate subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame is as follows: the
male should offer a date when vm(z, x) − c2 ≥ r(z) and the female should offer a date when
vf (z, x)− c2 ≥ r(x). This equilibrium satisfies Condition 2. Note that if e.g. the male does not
want to offer a date, then the female is indifferent between offering and not offering a date.
7. Some Results on the Equilibrium Strategy Profile
The results given in this section are not intended to fully characterise an equilibrium, but to
justify the method of solution adopted in Section 8.
Theorem 7.1. At a symmetric equilibrium satisfying Conditions 1-3, the value r(x) of the game
to an individual of beauty x is non-decreasing in x.
Proof. This follows from the assumption of subgame perfectness in the subgames defined
above. Suppose x2 > x3. At equilibrium, a female who is willing to date a male of beauty x3 is
willing to date a male of beauty x2. Similarly, in the dating subgame, a female who is willing
to mate with a male of type (x3, 0) will be willing mate with a male of type (x2, 0). Given the
strategies of the females, the problem faced by males reduces to a problem of optimal stopping.
A male of type (x2, 0) can ensure himself the same expected reward as a male of type (x3, 0) by
only dating females a type (x3, 0) male would date and mating with females a type (x3, 0) male
would mate with (under the assumption of mutual acceptance). 
Corollary to Theorem 7.1 Suppose x ≥ y. If an individual of beauty x accepts a prospective
partner of beauty y in the dating game, then acceptance is mutual.
Theorem 7.2. At a symmetric equilibrium satisfying Conditions 1-3, individuals of maximum
beauty, x1, offer dates to prospective partners of beauty above a certain threshold.
Proof. From the above corollary, the expected reward of a male of beauty x1 from the
dating subgame is non-decreasing in the beauty of the female (since character and beauty are
independent). Such a male offers a date if the expected reward from dating is at least as great
as r(x1). If this is holds for some level of beauty a(x1), then it holds for all levels of beauty
> a(x1). It cannot be optimal for males to never date. Hence, a(x1) < x1. 
Theorem 7.3. Suppose that at a symmetric equilibrium a male of beauty x2 offers a date to a
female of beauty x3, where x2 > x3. Any male of beauty z, where z ∈ [x3, x2], offers a date to a
female of beauty x2. Such a date is mutually acceptable.
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Proof. Let p(x2, x3) be the probability that a male of beauty x2 pairs with a female of
beauty x3 in the dating subgame. For mutual acceptance to occur, it suffices that the most
attractive individual accepts the prospective partner. Hence, for x2 ≥ x3,
p(x2, x3) = p(x3, x2) =
∫
y≥0,u(x3,y)≥r(x2)
f2(y)dy.
Let the expected reward of a male of beauty x2 from pairing with a female of beauty x3 be
w(x2, x3). If p(x2, x3) = 0, then by definition w(x2, x3) = 0. For x2 ≥ x3 and p(x2, x3) > 0,
w(x2, x3) =
1
p(x2, x3)
∫
y≥0,u(x3,y)≥r(x2)
u(x3, y)f2(y)dy.
w(x3, x2) =
1
p(x2, x3)
∫
y≥0,u(x3,y)≥r(x2)
u(x2, y)f2(y)dy.
It follows that if x2 ≥ x3, then w(x2, x3) ≤ w(x3, x2). Since at equilibrium a male of beauty x2
offers a date to a female of beauty x3, we have
(3) p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3)+[1−p(x2, x3)]r(x2)−c2≥r(x2)⇒p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3)≥p(x2, x3)r(x2)+c2.
From Theorem 7.1, in the dating subgame a male of type (z, 0) should accept any female of
beauty x3 that a male of type (x2, 0) would. Such acceptance is mutual. Hence, the expected
reward of a male of beauty z from such a date is bounded below by p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3) + [1 −
p(x2, x3)]r(z)− c2. From Inequality (3) and Theorem 7.1, we obtain
p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3) + [1− p(x2, x3)]r(z)− c2 ≥ p(x2, x3)r(x2) + [1− p(x2, x3)]r(z) ≥ r(z).
Hence, a male of beauty z should offer a date to a female of beauty x3.
The female’s expected reward from such a date is p(z, x3)w(x3, z) + [1 − p(z, x3)]r(x3) − c2.
Using, w(x3, z) ≥ w(z, x3), the condition for a male of beauty z to offer a date to a female of
beauty x3 and Theorem 7.1 in that order, we obtain
p(z, x3)w(x3, z) + [1− p(z, x3)]r(x3)− c2 ≥ p(z, x3)w(z, x3) + [1− p(z, x3)]r(x3)− c2
≥ p(z, x3)r(z) + [1− p(x2, x3)]r(x3) ≥ r(x3).
It follows that the female should also offer such a date. 
Corollary to Theorem 7.3 At a symmetric equilibrium, if individuals of maximum beauty
offer dates to those of minimum beauty, then all individuals date any prospective partner.
Theorem 7.4. At a symmetric equilibrium, if a male of beauty x2 offers a date to a female of
beauty x3, where x3 < x2, then the male offers a date to any female of beauty z, where z ∈ [x3, x2]
(note that from Theorem 7.1 the date is mutually acceptable).
Proof. Since a male of beauty x2 should offer a date to a female of beauty x3, Inequality
(3) holds. From Theorem 7.1, in the dating subgame if a male of type (x2, 0) accepts a female
of type (x3, y), then he should accept a female of type (z, y) and such acceptance is mutual.
Hence, the expected reward of a male of beauty x2 from dating a female of beauty z is bounded
below by p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3) + [1− p(x2, x3)]r(x2)− c2. This in turn is at least r(x2). It follows
that such a male should offer a date to a female of beauty z. 
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Theorem 7.5. At a symmetric equilibrium, if an individual of beauty x2 does not offer a date to
a prospective partner of beauty x3, where x3 < x2, then no individual of beauty z, where z > x2,
will offer a date to a prospective partner of beauty x3.
Proof. Since a male of beauty x2 does not offer a date to a female of beauty x3,
r(x2) > p(x2, x3)w(x2, x3) + [1− p(x2, x3)]r(x2)− c2 > p(z, x3)w(z, x3) + [1− p(z, x3)]r(x2)− c2,
where the second inequality follows from the optimality condition in the dating subgame. Thus
p(z, x3)w(z, x3) < p(z, x3)r(x2) + c2.
Hence,
p(z, x3)w(z, x3) + [1− p(z, x3)]r(z)− c2 < p(z, x3)r(x2) + [1− p(z, x3)]r(z) ≤ r(z).
Thus a male of beauty z should not offer a date to a female of beauty x3. 
Corollary to Theorems 7.3-7.5 At a symmetric equilibrium, an encounter between a male
of attractiveness x and a female of attractiveness y will result in a date if and only if y satisfies
a(x) ≤ y ≤ a−1(x), where a(x) is the minimum level of beauty inducing the offer of a date
from the male and a−1(x) is the maximum beauty of a female offering a date to such a male.
These functions are non-decreasing in x and a(x) ≤ x ≤ a−1(x). Also, a(x) < a−1(x), since the
probability of dating at any moment must be greater than 0.
This notation is used since a−1 is a generalisation of the inverse function of a. For example,
suppose a is an increasing, continuous function. It follows that if x = a(z), i.e. z = a−1(x), then z
is the maximum beauty of a female who offers a date to a male of beauty x. If a(z) = x⇔ z ∈ S,
then a−1(x) is defined to be the maximum value in the set S.
Remark This corollary states that dates occur between individuals of ’similar’ beauty. Note
that at equilibrium a searcher of beauty x is indifferent between offering and not offering a date
to a prospective partner of beauty > a−1(x), as such a prospective partner will not offer a date.
In a more general form of such a game, the offer of a date may be associated with costs, denoted
by c3. Suppose that offers of dates are made simultaneously. We should adapt the form of the
offer subgame defined by the payoff matrix in (2) by subtracting c3 from the payoff of the male
in row 1 and also from the payoff of the female in column 1. In this case, (con, con) is always
a Nash equilibrium. However, when vm(z, x) − c2 − c3 > r(z) and vf (z, x) − c2 − c3 > r(x),
then (off, off) is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Hence, if we assume that the Pareto
dominant Nash equilibrium is played, then (off, off) will be played when vm(z, x)− c2 − c3 >
r(z) and vf (z, x) − c2 − c3 > r(x), otherwise (con, con) is played. Since mutual agreement is
required for dating to occur, the outcome of such a game will be the same as in the original
formulation with the costs of offering a date incorporated into the dating costs. The only
difference is that when offering a date is costly, an individual will never offer a date when
the prospective partner does not wish to date. Now suppose that the male is the first to decide
whether to offer a date and if the female receives an offer, then she must decide whether to accept
it. Assume that the costs of an offer are only incurred by the male. In this case, we should solve
the extensive form of the offer subgame by recursion. The female only makes a decision when
she is offered a date. She should accept when vf (z, x) − c2 ≥ r(x). Given the female does not
want to accept an offer, then the male should not offer a date. Given that the female wishes
to accept an offer, then the male should offer a date if and only if vm(z, x) − c2 − c3 ≥ r(z).
Hence, when vm(z, x) − c2 − c3 > r(z) and vf (z, x) − c2 > r(x), the unique equilibrium path
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is (off, off). Otherwise, the equilibrium path involves the male not offering a date. When
c3 → 0, then the outcome of the game will be the same as in the original formulation. The only
difference is that a male will never offer a date when the female does not accept such an offer.
Now we derive a set of conditions that a symmetric equilibrium must satisfy. First, we
consider the condition for subgame perfectness in the dating subgame. Without loss of generality,
consider a male of type (z, 0). Suppose he meets a female of type (a(z), y), i.e. of the minimum
acceptable level of beauty. Since a(z) ≤ z, if the male accepts the female in the dating subgame,
then acceptance is mutual. The female should be accepted if and only if u(a(z), y) ≥ r(z). We
must consider the following two cases:
1: There exists a b(z) such that b(z) < y1 and u(a(z), b(z)) = r(z). In this case, the
male should accept a female in the dating subgame when the reward obtained from such
a pairing is greater than his expected total reward from search, i.e. u(x, y) ≥ r(z) =
u(a(z), b(z)), i.e. a male of attractiveness z will mate with a female of attractiveness a(z)
when her character differs from his by not more than b(z). As the beauty of a prospective
partner increases, the maximum acceptable difference in character also increases.
2: u(a(z), y1) ≥ r(z). In this case any female of beauty a(z) gives a male of beauty z a
greater reward than his expected total reward from search and so he should accept any
female of beauty ≥ a(z) in the dating subgame. In this case, define b(z) = y1.
Now consider the condition for subgame perfectness in the offer subgame. A male should offer
a date to a female when the expected reward from the date is greater than the expected reward
from search. Note that a(z) ≤ z and the expected reward of a male of type (z, 0) from dating a
female of beauty x, where x ≤ z, is increasing in x. The following two cases may occur:
a: a(z) > x0. In this case, the expected reward from dating a female of beauty a(z) must
be equal to r(z). It follows that
(4)
∫ b(z)
0
u(a(z), y)f2(y)dy +
∫ y1
b(z)
r(z)f2(y)dy − c2 = r(z).
b: If there is no solution a(z) of Equation (4) such that x0 < a(z) ≤ z, then a(z) = x0, i.e.
a male of beauty z dates any female.
Let A(z) be the set of females a male of type (z, 0) will mate with at equilibrium (under the
assumption of mutual acceptance in both subgames). In order to define a symmetric equilibrium,
we must specify a(z), r(z) and b(z) for x0 ≤ z ≤ x1. Hence, we need one more condition. This
is given by Equation (1). Note that specifying a(x1) and r(x1) defines the strategy of a male
of maximum beauty, since he will offer dates to females of beauty ≥ a(x1) and in the dating
subgame mate with females who ensure a reward of at least r(x1). Also, the maximum reward
obtained from a pairing is u(x1, 0) and an individual must both observe and date at least one
prospective partner. Hence, r(x1) < u(x1, 0)− c1 − c2.
The results given above are valid when u(x, y) is increasing in x and decreasing in y. In the
further analysis of this game we make the additional assumption that u is a separable function,
i.e. u(x, y) = u1(x)− u2(y), where both u1 and u2 are strictly increasing functions.
Theorem 7.6. Suppose the reward function u is separable. The optimal strategy of an individual
of beauty x1 is uniquely defined.
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Proof. It will be shown that there is exactly one optimal response corresponding to any
pair of positive costs (c1, c2).
Case 1: A male of maximum beauty is choosy in both subgames.
Firstly, we assume that a(z) > x0 and b(z) < y1. Combining the equilibrium conditions
from the two subgames, the expected reward of a type (z, 0) male from search is equal both to
u(a(z), b(z)) and to the expected reward from dating a female of beauty a(z). Hence,
r(z) = u(a(z), b(z)) =
∫ b(z)
0
u(a(z), y)f2(y)dy +
∫ y1
b(z)
r(z)f2(y)dy − c2.
Rearranging this equation, it follows from the separability of the function u that
(5) c2 =
∫ b(z)
0
[u2(b(z))− u2(y)]f2(y)dy.
Let
v1(s) =
∫ s
0
[u2(s)− u2(y)]f2(y)dy.
Note that for 0 ≤ y ≤ y1, v1(s) can be expressed as g1(s)q1(s), where g1(s) is the expected gain
in the reward obtained by a male of character 0 from pairing with a female of randomly chosen
absolute character ≤ s rather than with a female of character s and q1(s) is the probability
of a female having an absolute character ≤ s. Thus v1(0) = 0, v1(y1) = u2(y1) − E[u2(Y )]
and v1(s) is a continuous, strictly increasing function for 0 < s < y1. It follows that for
c2 < u2(y1)− E[u2(Y )] there is a unique solution b(z) of Equation (5), where 0 < b(z) < y1.
Setting z = x1 and rearranging Equation (1), it follows from Equation (5) that
c1+
[∫ b(x1)
0
[u2(b(x1))− u2(y)]f2(y)dy
]∫ x1
a(x1)
f1(x)dx =
∫ ∫
A(x1)
[u(x, y)−u(a(x1), b(x1))]f(x, y)dxdy.
Since the beauty and character of a female are independent, it follows that
c1 +
∫ x1
a(x1)
∫ b(x1)
0
[u2(b(x1))−u2(y)]f(x, y)dydx =
∫ ∫
A(x1)
[u(x, y)−u(a(x1), b(x1))]f(x, y)dxdy.
It should be noted that [a(x1), x1] × [0, b(x1)] ⊆ A(x1), since a male of type (x1, 0) may mate
with a female of character > b(x1). Let A(x1) = ([a(x1), x1]× [0, b(x1)]) ∪ B˜(a(x1)), where
B˜(s) = {(x, y) : x ≥ s, b(x1) ≤ y ≤ y1, u(x, y) ≥ u(s, b(x1))} [i.e. the set of females that a
male of beauty x1 will mate with is split into two disjoint sets, those whose character differs
by ≤ b(x1) and those whose character differs by > b(x1)]. Rearranging the above equation, it
follows from the separability of u that
(6) c1=
∫ x1
a(x1)
∫ b(x1)
0
[u1(x)−u1(a(x1))]f(x, y)dydx+
∫ ∫
B˜(a(x1))
[u(x, y)−u(a(x1), b(x1))]f(x, y)dxdy.
Let
(7) v2(s) =
∫ x1
s
∫ b(x1)
0
[u1(x)− u1(s)]f(x, y)dydx+
∫ ∫
B˜(s)
[u(x, y)− u(s, b(x1))]f(x, y)dxdy.
Note that v2(s) can be expressed as q2(s)[g2(s)−k2(s)], where q2(s) is the proportion of females
who have beauty ≥ s and also give a male of type (z, 0) a reward ≥ u(s, b(x1)), g2(s) is the
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expected reward of the male from pairing with such a female and k2(s) is the expected reward
of the male from pairing with a female of beauty s who gives the male a reward ≥ u(s, b(x1)).
Hence, v2(x1) = 0 and v2(s) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function for x0 ≤ w ≤ x1. Thus
for c1 < v2(x0) there is a unique solution a(x1) of Equation (6), where x0 < a(x1) < x1 . Adding
c2 to both sides of this inequality, from Equation (5), the separability of u and the independence
of the two traits,
(8) c1 + c2 <
∫ ∫
B(b(x1))
[u(x, y)− u(x0, b(x1))]f(x, y)dydx,
where B(s) = {(x, y) : u(x, y) ≥ u(x0, s)}. Hence, when c2 < u2(y1)− E[u2(Y )] and Condition
(8) is satisfied, males of maximum beauty have a unique optimal strategy.
Case 2: Males of maximum beauty are not choosy when offering dates, but choosy
in certain dating subgames.
Now consider the case in which a male of type (z, 0) offers a date to any female, i.e. a(z) = x0,
but only pairs with a female of minimum beauty if her character is ≤ y˜(z), where 0 < y˜(z) < y1.
Since this male offers dates to females of beauty x0, it follows that
r(z) = u(x0, y˜(z)) ≤
∫ y˜(z)
0
u(x0, y)f2(y)dy +
∫ y1
y˜(z)
r(z)f2(y)dy − c2.
From the separability of u, we obtain
c2 ≤
∫ y˜(z)
0
[u2(y˜(z))− u2(y)]f2(y)dy = v1(y˜(z)).
Since v1 is strictly increasing, y˜(z) ≥ b(z), where b(z) is the solution of Equation (5). From the
analysis of Case 1, c2 < u2(y1) − E[u2(Y )]. This argument holds for all beauty levels z, such
that x0 ≤ z ≤ x1.
Setting z = x1 and considering the equilibrium condition in the supergame Γ, we obtain
u(x0, y˜(x1)) =
∫ ∫
A(x1)
u(x, y)f(x, y)dydx− c1 − c2∫ ∫
A(x1)
f(x, y)dydx
,
where A(x1) = {(x, y) : u(x, y) ≥ u(x0, y˜(x1))} is the set of females the male will mate with
under such a strategy. Rearranging this equation, we obtain
(9) c1 + c2 =
∫ ∫
A(x1)
[u(x, y)− u(x0, y˜(x1))]f(x, y)dydx.
Recall that B(s) = {(x, y) : u(x, y) ≥ u(x0, s)}. Let
v3(s) =
∫ ∫
B(s)
[u(x, y)− u(x0, s)]f(x, y)dydx.
Note that v3(s) can be expressed as q3(s)[g3(s) − u(x0, s)], where q3(s) is the proportion of
females giving the male a reward ≥ u(x0, s) and g3(s) is the expected reward of the male from
pairing with a such a female. Hence,
v3(y1) = E[u(X,Y )]− u(x0, y1) = E[u1(Y )]− u1(x0) + u2(y1)− E[u2(Y )].
Also, v3(b(x1)) is given by the right hand side of Inequality (8).
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Since v3(s) is a continuous, strictly increasing function for s between 0 and y1, y˜(x1) ≥ b(x1)
and y˜(x1) is a solution of Equation (9), it follows that v3(b(x1)) ≤ c1 + c2. Hence, if c2 <
u2(y1) − E[u2(Y )], c1 + c2 < E[u1(X)] − u1(x0) + u2(y1) − E[u2(Y )] and Condition (8) is not
satisfied, then males of beauty x1 have a unique optimal strategy under which they date any
female but do not pair with all females.
Case 3: Males of beauty x1 are choosy when offering dates, but not choosy in
dating subgames.
Now suppose that a male of beauty z is willing to pair with any female of beauty ≥ a(z),
where a(x1) > x0. It follows that the expected reward of the male from dating a female of
beauty a(z) (minus the dating costs) must be equal to the expected reward from search, but
less than or equal to the reward from pairing with a female of type (a(z), y1), i.e.
u(a(z), y1) ≥ r(z) =
∫ y1
0
u(a(z), y)f2(y)dy − c2.
From the separability of u, we obtain
c2 ≥
∫ y1
0
[u2(y1)− u2(y)]f2(y)dy = u2(y1)− E[u2(Y )].
This holds for all beauty levels between x0 and x1. Setting z = x1, from Equation (1), we obtain∫ y1
0
u(a(x1), y)f2(y)dy − c2 =
∫ y1
0
∫ x1
a(x1)
u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy − c1∫ x1
a(x1)
f1(x)dx
− c2.
Using the separability of u, together with the independence of the two traits, we obtain
c1 =
∫ x1
a(x1)
[u1(x)− u1(a(x1))]f1(x)dx.
Let
v4(s) =
∫ x1
s
[u1(x)− u1(s)]f1(x)dx.
Note that v4(s) can be expressed as q4(s)g4(s), where q4(s) is the proportion of females with
beauty ≥ s and g4(s) is the expected gain of a male from pairing with such a female rather
than with a female of beauty s. Hence, v4(x0) = E[u1(X)] − u1(x0), v4(x1) = 0 and v4(s) is a
continuous function, strictly decreasing for s between x0 and x1. Hence, if c1 < E[u1(X)]−u1(x0)
and c2 ≥ u2(y1)−E[u2(Y )], then males of beauty x1 have a unique optimal strategy under which
they are choosy when offering a date, but pair with the first female dated.
Case 4: Males of maximum beauty are not choosy in either subgame.
Since a male of beauty x1 is willing to date and pair with any female, we must have
u(x0, y1) ≥
∫ y1
0
∫ x1
x0
u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy − c1 − c2.
Using the separability of u, it follows that
(10) c1 + c2 ≥ E[u1(X)]− u1(x0) + u2(y1)− E[u2(Y )].
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u 2
(y
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E[
u 2
(Y
)] 
Figure 1. Choosiness of individuals of maximum beauty. In each region the
first position states whether such an individual is choosy when offering dates and
the second position states whether such an individual is choosy in the dating
subgame with prospective partners of beauty a(x1).
Also, since the expected reward of such a male from a date with a female of beauty x0 must
be greater than or equal to his expected reward from search, we obtain∫ y1
0
∫ x1
x0
u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy − c1 − c2 ≤
∫ y1
0
u(x0, y)f2(y)dy − c2.
Using the separability of u and the independence of character and beauty, it follows that
(11) c1 ≥ E[u1(X)]− u1(x0).
Hence, when Conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied, it is optimal for individuals of maximum
beauty to date and pair with the first prospective partner encountered.
Conclusion. These four cases partition the set {(c1, c2) : c1, c2 > 0}. In each case there is a
unique solution of the problem faced by an individual of maximum beauty. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the form of the strategy used by an individual of maximum beauty.
Corollary to Theorem 7.6. If Conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied, at the symmetric
equilibrium profile all individuals date and pair with their first prospective partner.
In this case, for all z between x0 and x1 the value function for the game is given by
r(z) =
∫ y1
0
∫ x1
x0
u(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy − c1 − c2.
There are five possible forms of the set A(x1) that do not correspond to random pairing.
1: Males of beauty x1 are choosy offering dates and do not accept all females of beauty x1.
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Figure 2. Possible forms of the set A(x1). The first five graphs correspond to
the five cases listed above. The graph at the bottom right corresponds to random
pairing. It is assumed that x0 = 0, x1 = y1 = 1.
2: Males of beauty x1 are choosy offering dates, accept all females of beauty x1, but not
all females of beauty a(x1).
3: Males of beauty x1 are choosy offering dates, but pair with the first female dated.
4: Males of beauty x1 are not choosy offering dates, but do not pair with all females of
beauty x1.
5: Males of beauty x1 are not choosy offering dates, do not pair with all females of beauty
x0, but do pair with all females of beauty x1.
These sets are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Theorem 7.7. Suppose u is separable, c1 < E[u1(X)]− u1(x0) and c2 ≥ u2(y1)−E[u2(Y )]. At
the symmetric equilibrium, individuals are partitioned into a finite number of classes according to
beauty. The number of classes, m, and levels of beauty associated with each class can be derived
by induction. Let the levels of beauty corresponding to the classes be D1, D2, . . . , Dm, where Di
consists of all beauty levels between xi+1 and xi, where x1 > x2 > x3 > . . . > xm+1 = x0. A
searcher in class i pairs with the first prospective partner from class i.
This equilibrium corresponds to Case 3 and is analogous to the equilibrium of the classical
two-sided job search problem derived by McNamara and Collins (1990). The proof is similar.
Proof. Let D1 = [a(x1), x1]. From the form of a symmetric equilibrium, any two individ-
uals of beauty in D1 are mutually acceptable to each other in both the offer and the dating
subgames and such individuals do not date prospective partners not in D1. The problem faced
by individuals not in D1 then reduces to the following supergame:
1: The distribution of beauty and character are assumed to be the same as in the original
game. An encounter with a prospective partner of beauty ≤ a(x1) is treated in the same
way as in the original game. Prospective partners of beauty > a(x1) are assumed to give
a utility of −∞, i.e. searchers will not date them.
2: Search and dating costs are the same as in the original problem.
From Theorem 7.6, in this reduced game males of beauty a(x1) pair with any female or date
and pair with any female of beauty ≥ a(a(x1)) = a2(x1) > x0. In the first case m = 2 and
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D2 = [x0, a(x1)]. In the second case, we can derive the form of the reduced supergame faced by
individuals of beauty < a2(x1). The remaining Di can be found by iteratively defining further
reduced versions of the original supergame. Let Γi denote the i-th reduced supergame defined
in this way, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1. Males involved in Γi are of beauty ≤ ai(x1). Suppose a male of
beauty ai(x1) should be choosy in Γi. From the equilibrium conditions,
c1 =
∫ ai−1(x1)
ai(x1)
[u1(x)− u1(ai(x1))]f1(x)dx ≤ [u1(ai−1(x1))− u1(ai(x1))]
∫ ai−1(x1)
ai(x1)
f1(x)dx.
It follows that the proportion of males in class Di, P (Di), satisfies
P (Di) ≥ c1
u1(x1)− u1(x0) ≡
1
q
> 0.
Hence, m is bounded above by dqe, where dxe is the smallest integer not exceeded by x. 
Such an equilibrium is considered in Example 2.
Suppose a male of type (z, 0) meets a female of type (x, y) (where y > 0). The pair will date if
a(z) ≤ x ≤ a−1(z). In the dating subgame, when x ≤ z, acceptance is mutual if u(x, y) ≥ r(z).
When x > z, acceptance is mutual if u(z, y) ≥ r(x). It follows that A(z) = A3(z)∪A4(z), where
A3(z) and A4(z) are the following disjoint sets:
A3(z) = {(x, y) : a(z) ≤ x ≤ z, u(x, y) ≥ r(z)}
A4(z) = {(x, y) : z < x ≤ a−1(z), u(z, y) ≥ r(x)}.
Although A(z) can always be described in this way, we must take account of the form of A(z)
when solving the game. This form depends on the following three conditions:
C1: Do males of beauty x1 date females of beauty z? i.e. is a(x1) ≤ z?
C2: Do males of beauty z date females of beauty x0? i.e. is a(z) > x0?
C3: Do males of beauty z pair only with some females of the same beauty? i.e. is u(z, y1) <
r(z)?
The possible forms of A(z) are illustrated in Fig. 3. It should be noted that if u(z, y1) > r(z),
we should find a1(z) and a2(z), such that a(z) ≤ a1(z) ≤ z ≤ a2(z) ≤ a−1(z) and males of
beauty z pair with all females of beauty in [a1(z), a2(z)], but not with all females of beauty
x /∈ [a1(z), a2(z)]. Note that the maximal mutually acceptable difference in character occurs
when two prospective partners have the same beauty.
In Cases 2 and 5, a female of beauty x1 pairs with any male of beauty ≥ a1(x1). Thus males
of beauty ≥ a1(x1) face a one-sided search problem. Hence, r(z) = r(x1) and A(z) = A(x1) for
z ≥ a1(x1). Consider a male of beauty just below a1(x1). From the form of the optimal policy
of those of higher beauty, he would be unacceptable to a highly attractive female only when the
difference between their characters is large. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the value
function r is continuous in some interval (x, a1(x1)). Arguing similarly, in Cases 1 and 4, a male
of beauty just below x1 will have only marginally worse opportunities for pairing than a male
of beauty x1. Hence, it seems reasonable that in Cases 1, 2, 4 and 5 the value function satisfies
a differential equation with the boundary condition given by the value of r(a1(x1)) in Cases 2
and 5 and by the value of r(x1) in Cases 1 and 4. This differential equation may be obtained by
appropriately rearranging Equation (1) and differentiating with respect to z. The derivation of
this equation and its numerical solution are illustrated by Example 1 in the following section.
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a(1)>0.5, a(0.5)>0, r(0.5)! u(0.5,1) 
                   A(0.5)
a(1)" 0.5, a(0.5)>0, r(0.5)! u(0.5,1)
                     A(0.5)
 a(1)" 0.5, a(0.5)=0, r(0.5)! u(0.5,1)
                  A(0.5)
a(1)>0.5, a(0.5)=0, r(0.5)! u(0.5,1) 
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a(1)>0.5, a(0.5)>0, r(0.5)<u(0.5,1)               A(0.5)
a(1)" 0.5, a(0.5)>0, r(0.5)<u(0.5,1) 
                      A(0.5)
a(1)" 0.5, a(0.5)=0, r(0.5)<u(0.5,1)                  A(0.5)
a(1)>0.5, a(0.5)=0, r(0.5)<u(0.5,1) 
Figure 3. Possible forms of the set A(z) for z = 0.5, x0 = 0, x1 = y1 = 1.
8. Examples
Suppose beauty and character are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and [−1, 1], respectively, i.e.
f1(x) = f2(x) = 1, when x ∈ [0, 1], otherwise f1(x) = f2(x) = 0. Search and dating costs are
are equal to c1 and c2, respectively. The reward from pairing is assumed to be the beauty of
the partner minus the difference between the characters of the pair, d(y1, y2), where d(y1, y2) =
min{|y1 − y2|, 2− |y1 − y2|}. Hence, u(x, y) = x− y, thus u is separable, u1(x) = x, u2(y) = y.
From Theorem 7.6, a male may be choosy in the dating subgame only when c2 < 0.5. Assume
c2 < 0.5. Suppose that a(z) > 0 and b(z) < 1, i.e. a male of beauty z is choosy when
offering dates and in dates with females of beauty a(z). It follows that Equation (5) holds and
b(z) =
√
2c2. Since r(z) = u(a(z), b(z)),
(12) r(z) = a(z)−√2c2.
This equation holds as long as a(z) ≥ 0, i.e. r(z) ≥ −√2c2.
From the form of u, if r(1) > 0, then males of beauty 1 do not pair with all females of beauty
1. If −√2c2 < r(1) < 0, then males of beauty 1 pair with any female above some beauty (to be
specified). The probability of an individual of beauty z mating at any given moment is |A(z)|,
where |A(z)| denotes the area of the set A(z).
8.1. Example 1. Assume r(1) ≥ 0. The set A(1) is given by
A(1) = {(x, y) : a(1) ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ x− r(1)}.
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Setting z = 1, using Equation (12) and rearranging Equation (1), we obtain
(13) 0 = r(1)3 − 3r(1)2 + r(1)[3− 6c2]− 1 + 6c1 + 6c2 − 4c2
√
2c2.
This equation is valid if there is a solution r(1), where 0 < r(1) < 1. For example, when
c1 = c2 = 0.08, we obtain the boundary condition
r(1)3 − 3r(1)2 + 2.52r(1)− 0.168 = 0.
The unique real solution is r(1) ≈ 0.07283. It follows that a(1) = r(1) +√2c2 = z0 ≈ 0.47283.
We now derive a differential equation that r(z) must satisfy. Suppose a) z ≥ a(1), b) a(z) ≥
0⇒ r(z) ≥ −√2c2 and c) r(z) ≥ z−1, i.e. conditions C1-C3 from Section 7 hold. A(z) is of the
form illustrated by the top right graph in Fig. 3. The set A(z) is given by B(z) ∪ C(z), where
B(z) = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ x− r(z), a(z) ≤ x ≤ z}
C(z) = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ z − r(x), z ≤ x ≤ 1}.
Rearranging Equation (1), we obtain∫ 1
z
r(x)
[
z−x+r(z)− r(x)
2
]
dx=
r(z)3−z3+3z2[1−r(z)]−3z[1+r(z)2]−4c2
√
2c2
6
+(z−c2)r(z)+c1+c2.
Differentiating with respect to z, we obtain the following integro-differential equation
r′(z) =
2zr(z)− 2r(z) + z2 + 1− 2z + 2 ∫ 1z r(x)dx
2z + r(z)2 − 2zr(z)− z2 − 2c2 − 2
∫ 1
z r(x)dx
.
Solving this equation numerically using a step length of h = 10−4, Conditions C1-C3 remain
satisfied as long as Condition C1 is satisfied, i.e. z ≥ z0. Also, r(z0) ≈ −0.0241.
Suppose Conditions C2 and C3 are satisfied for z between z1 and z0. In this case, A(z) is of
the form illustrated by the top left graph in Fig. 3. The set A(z) is given by B(z)∪D(z), where
B(z) is defined as above and
D(z) = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ z − r(x), z ≤ x ≤ a−1(z)}.
Since a−1(z) ≥ z ≥ a(z) and a(z) = r(z) +√2c2, a−1(z) can be approximated using previously
calculated values of r(x) for x > z and linear interpolation. The derivative of a−1(z) with respect
to z can be estimated from these values. Rearranging Equation (1), we obtain∫ a−1(z)
z
r(x)
[
z−x+r(z)− r(x)
2
]
dx =
r(z)3−z3+3z2[a−1(z)−r(z)]−3z{[a−1(z)]2+r(z)2}−4c2
√
2c2
6
+
+za−1(z)r(z) + c1 + c2a−1(z)− c2r(z).
Differentiating this equation with respect to z, using r[a−1(z)] = z −√2c2 and rearranging,
r′(z)=
2[a−1(z)]′{√2c2[a−1(z)−r(z)]−2c2}+2
∫ a−1(z)
z r(x)dx+a
−1(z)[a−1(z)−2z−2r(z)]+z2+2zr(z)
r(z)2 − z2 − 2zr(z) + 2za−1(z)− 2c2 − 2
∫ a−1(z)
z r(x)dx
.
Solving this equation numerically, z1 ≈ 0.4175. We have r(z1) = −0.4000 ⇒ a(z1) = 0. Hence,
a(z) = 0 for z < z1. Suppose Condition C3 is satisfied for z in [z2, z1]. For such z, A(z) is of the
form illustrated by the graph on left of row 2 in Fig. 3. The set A(z) = E(z) ∪D(z), where
E(z) = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ x− r(z), 0 ≤ x ≤ z}.
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Figure 4. Value function for the game with c1 = c2 = 0.08.
Rearranging Equation (1), we obtain∫ a−1(z)
z
r(x)
[
z−x+r(z)− r(x)
2
]
dx=za−1(z)r(z)+
3{z2a−1(z)−zr(z)2−z2r(z)−z[a−1(z)]2}−z3
6
+c1+c2a−1(z).
Differentiating this equation with respect to z and rearranging, we obtain
r′(z)=
2[a−1(z)]′{√2c2[a−1(z)−r(z)]−2c2}+2
∫ a−1(z)
z r(x)dx+a
−1(z)[a−1(z)−2z−2r(z)]+z2+2zr(z)
2za−1(z)− 2zr(z)− z2 − 2 ∫ a−1(z)z r(x)dx .
Solving this equation numerically, Condition C3 is satisfied for all z ∈ [0, z1] and r(0) ≈ −0.5958.
Fig. 4 illustrates the value function. We can distinguish three classes of beauty. For high
beauty (z > 0.4728), r(z) is slowly increasing in z. Males of beauty 1 date prospective partners
of beauty ≥ 0.4728. Hence, individuals of beauty around 0.5 are almost as choosy as individuals
of beauty 1. Individuals in this class almost exclusively date other members of the same class.
For example, individuals of beauty 0.4728 date prospective partners of beauty in [0.3759, 1].
For medium levels of beauty (between 0.4175 and 0.4728), r(z) increases rapidly in z. Since
the minimum acceptable beauty, a(z), increases slowly in z for z > 0.4728, a−1(z) is rapidly
increasing in z for z just below 0.4728.
For low levels of beauty (below 0.4175), r(z) is only slowly increasing in z. Individuals of
beauty 0.4175 will date individuals of beauty 0 and are not dated by individuals of beauty
above 0.5496. Hence, individuals in this class almost exclusively date other members of the
class. Fig. 5 illustrates the set of mutually acceptable partners for individuals of beauty levels
1 (maximum), 0.5 (lower end of the highly attractive class), 0.45 (medium level of beauty), 0.4
(upper end of the lowly attractive class).
Numerical results indicate that decreasing the search costs increases the number of these
’pseudo-classes’ and the correlation between the trait values of partners. These classes are more
fuzzy for lower levels of beauty than high levels.
8.2. Example 2. Assume c1 = 0.1 and c2 = 0.6. From Theorem 7.6, at the unique symmetric
equilibrium individuals are partitioned into classes according to beauty. We have
c1 =
∫ 1
a(1)
[u1(x)− u1(a(1))]dx.
It follows that
a(1)2 − 2a(1) + 0.8 = 0⇒ a(1) = 1−
√
0.2 ≈ 0.5528.
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Figure 5. Sets of mutually acceptable partners with c1 = c2 = 0.08.
Hence, D1 = [1 −
√
0.2, 1]. Similarly, we obtain D2 = [1 − 2
√
0.2, 1 −√0.2) ≈ [0.1056, 0.5528).
Individuals in the third class of beauty levels, D3 = [0, 1 − 2
√
0.2] are not choosy. Note that
although both types of costs have increased, individuals of maximum beauty are more demanding
with regard to the beauty of a prospective partner than at the equilibrium derived in Example
1. Since dating costs are very high, the expected costs of finding a partner of similar character
are prohibitively large and searchers compensate by trying to find a more attractive partner.
The expected beauty of the eventual partner of a Class 1 female is (1 + a(1))/2 = 1−√0.05.
The expected number of prospective partners she sees is 1/[1 − a(1)] = 5√0.2. Since each
individual dates exactly once and the expected difference between characters is 0.5, it follows
that for 1−√0.2 ≤ z ≤ 1,
r(z) = 1−
√
0.05− 0.5− 5
√
0.2c1 − c2 ≈ −0.5472.
Similarly, it can be shown that for 1− 2√0.2 ≤ z < 1−√0.2,
r(z) = 1−
√
0.45− 0.5− 5
√
0.2c1 − c2 ≈ −0.9944
and for 0 ≤ z < 1− 2√0.2,
r(z) = (0.5−
√
0.2)− 0.5− (5 + 10
√
0.2)c1 − c2 ≈ −1.9944.
9. Generalisation of the Model
Suppose that character is placed along a line instead of around a circle, i.e. the difference
between characters is the standard absolute difference. In the problems analogous to those
presented in Section 8, there is still a large degree of symmetry with respect to sex and character
(e.g. individuals of types (x, y) and (x,−y) can be assumed to have the same expected return
from search). However, the value function has both beauty and character as arguments.
We wish to derive an equilibrium which reflects this inherent symmetry. Suppose a type
[x2, y2] male is willing to date a female of beauty x3 and pairs with a female of type [x3, y3].
Firstly, a type [x2, y2] female should be willing to date a male of beauty x3 and pair with a
male of type [x3, y3]. Secondly, a type [x2,−y2] male should be willing to date a female of
beauty x3 and pair with a female of type [x3,−y3]. Assume that the distribution of character
is symmetric about zero and f2(y) is non-increasing for y ≥ 0. It is expected that males of type
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[x1, 0] have the highest expected reward from search (see Alpern and Reyniers [1999]) and thus
such individuals face a one-sided search problem. However, suppose an individual of high beauty
and extreme character accepts a prospective partner of lower beauty and central character. In
this generalised problem, it is not clear that acceptance will be mutual.
Hence, such a generalised problem seems very difficult to solve. One possible approach might
be to use policy iteration. Starting with an initial strategy profile pi0, one calculates the set of
optimal responses of individuals according to type. Call this optimal response profile pi1. In the
same way pii+1 is defined as the best response profile to the strategy profile pii. If such an iterative
procedure converges, it converges to an equilibrium strategy profile. Ramsey (2010) uses such
an approach to a problem in which beauty and character come from discrete distributions.
10. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of partnership formation where multiple traits are observed. We
consider a particular type of such problems in which the distributions of the traits, as well as
search and dating costs, are independent of the class (sex) of a player. A numerical procedure
to estimate a symmetric equilibrium is described. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium criteria are a generalisation of the optimality criterion used by McNamara
and Collins (1990) for the classical two-sided job search problem. At the equilibrium of their
game, the population are divided into classes according to beauty. In the game presented here, if
the costs of dating (i.e. of observing character) are high, then there is such an equilibrium. For
lower dating costs, the form of the symmetric equilibrium is more complex, but still intuitive.
Individuals date prospective partners of similar beauty and pair with a prospective partner if the
reward gained from such a partnership is at least as great as the expected reward from future
search. This leads to assortative matching, i.e. each individual pairs with another of similar
beauty and character. The lower the search costs, the higher the degree of association between
the traits of partners.
The use of this combination of preferences would seem to be logical in relation to mate choice.
Although there is no perfect correlation in individuals’ assessment of the beauty of members
of the other sex, there is normally a very high level of agreement. Using such an approach,
individuals have their own personal ranking of members of the other class. This approach
seems to be a good compromise between the approach used in the classical matching problem
(see Gale and Shapley [1962]) and the assumption of common preferences made in classical job
search and mate choice problems. These ’mixed’ preferences seem to be reasonably tractable
within the framework of searching for a partner within a large population and allow a general
enough framework to model the preferences of individuals reasonably well (although modelling
character as a one-dimensional variable seems rather simplistic).
For simplicity, it was assumed that individuals know their own beauty and character, whereas
in practice they may have to learn about these measures (see Fawcett and Bleay [2009]). Also,
it is assumed that individuals are able to measure beauty and character perfectly, although at
some cost. It would be interesting to consider different ways of gaining information during the
search process. For example, some information about the character of a prospective partner
may be readily available. Hence, an improved model would allow some information to be gained
on both the beauty and character of a prospective partner at each stage of an interaction. As
described in the previous section, it would also be useful to adapt the algorithm to problems in
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which character levels do not form a circle. Finally, it would be interesting to consider games in
which the distribution of traits and/or search costs depended on sex.
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